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Canada
CLIFF SOSNow, ALEXANDER A. JEGLIC, RINA SHAH, MARTIN G. MASSE, THOMAS
SLADE, JOHN W. BOSCARIOL, MARK KATZ, ERIKA DOUGLAS, WENDY WAGNER,
JUSIN PERSAUD, AND SERGIO R. KARAS*

This article reviews significant legal developments in Canada during 2011.1

I. Judicial Review of Investor-State Arbitrations Under NAFTA*
Ontario's highest appellate court has weighed in on the scope of judicial review of investor-state arbitration decisions conducted pursuant to Chapter 11 of the North Ameri-

can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). On October 4, 2011, the Ontario Court of Appeal
released its decision in Mexico v. Cargill,Inc.,2 affirming a lower court's decision refusing
to set aside the damages portion of a NAFTA arbitration award in favor of Cargill. Although the Court of Appeal found that the standard of review to be applied by a domestic
court in reviewing whether an international arbitration panel went beyond its jurisdiction
is one of "correctness," it upheld the decision on the basis that reviewing courts should

"intervene only in rare circumstances where there is a true question of jurisdiction." 3 The
court did not overturn the arbitral tribunal decision even in the face of a less deferential
standard of review. In so doing, it upheld the tribunal's expansive view of the types of
damages recoverable by NAFTA Chapter 11 investor claimants.
The dispute began with Mexico enacting trade barriers to protect its sugar industry in
response to a switch by the domestic soft drink industry from sugar to high-fructose corn
syrup (HFCS), a low-cost substitute. 4 The barriers forced Cargill to shut down its U.S.
HFCS production and distribution centers, as well as its Mexican HFCS distribution
* Edited by Cliff Sosnow, Vice-Chair, ABA Canada Committee, Partner and Chair of the International
Trade & Investment Group at Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP; Alexander A. Jeglic, Vice-Chair, ABA Canada
Committee, Legal Counsel Canadian Commercial Corporation; and Rina Shah, Policy Analyst/Presidential
Management Fellow, National Healthcare Operations, Office of Personnel Management.
1. For developments during 2010, see Sandra Walker et al., Canada, 45 INT'L LAW. 471, 471-86 (2011).
For developments during 2009, see John W. Boscariol et al., Canada,44 INT'L LAW. 613, 613-29 (2011).
* This section was authored by Martin G. Masse, Partner at McMillan LLP, and Thomas Slade,
Associate at McMillan LLP.
2. United Mexican States v. Cargill, Inc., 2011 CANLH 622107 OR. 3d 528, para. 86 (Can. Ont.O.A.C.).
3. Id. para. 44.
4. Id. paras. 4-5.
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center operated by its subsidiary Cargill de Mexico (CdM).5 Cargill submitted a Chapter
11 arbitration claim for damages suffered by both CdM in Mexico and by Cargill in the
6
United States.
The arbitration panel found for Cargill and awarded damages of US$77 million for upstream and down-stream losses. 7 The down-stream losses were CdM's lost sales to the
Mexican market and the up-stream losses were Cargill's lost sales to CdM.8 The arbitration panel distinguished the NAFTA panel decision in Archer DanielsMidland Co. v. United
Mexican States,9 dealing with similar facts, in which recovery for up-stream losses was
denied. The panel in Cargill took a broader approach, determining that recoverable losses
suffered by Cargill were not limited to those in Mexico, but included the upstream losses
suffered in the United States.10
Mexico contested the jurisdiction of the panel to award up-stream losses to Cargill."
Because the parties designated Toronto, Ontario, as the place of arbitration, Mexico initially asked the Ontario Superior Court ofJustice to review the award on the basis of the
grounds of review in the UNCITRAL Model Law (Model Law), 12 which applied to the
3
arbitration.
Mexico argued that the award of damages for up-stream losses to Cargill's U.S. operations was "beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration" under Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of
the Model Law. 14 It relied on the fact that NAFTA Chapter 11 applies only to measures
relating to investments that are in the territory of the party enacting those measures.' 5
The application judge for the Superior Court held that the standard of review to be applied on issues of jurisdiction was reasonableness, and applied that standard to uphold the
6
panel's award.'
The Court of Appeal considered the appropriate standard of review applicable to the
decision of a Chapter 11 NAFTA arbitral panel. 17 It examined Article 34 of the Model
Law and noted that an award may be set aside only when one of the listed deficiencies can
be proven. I8 The court then considered Canadian case law, which held that reviewing
courts should only interfere sparingly or in extraordinary cases.' 9 Finally, it relied on a
Canadian Supreme Court decision, 20 which stated that a tribunal must be correct in its
5. Id. para. 6.
6. Id. para. 7.
7. Id. para. 10.
8. See id.
9. Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle IngredientsAmericas, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05, Breach of Ch. 11 of NAFTA, 1 304 (Nov. 21, 2007), available at http://
italaw.com/documentrsADMTateRedactedAward.pdf.
10. See Cargill, 107 O.R. 3d, para. 13.
11. Id.
para. 14.
12. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration was enacted in Ontario by the
International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. II, art. 9.
13. Cargill, 107 O.R.3d 528, para. 9.
14. Id.paras. 14-15.
15. Id.paras. 36-65.
16. Id.para. 19.
17. Id.para. 26.
18. Id.para. 31.
19. Id.para. 33.
20. See Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (Can.).
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determination of a true question of jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the standard
of review for true jurisdictional questions was correctness; a tribunal does not have the
authority to expand its jurisdiction with an incorrect interpretation of its enabling statute.21 The Court of Appeal then applied the correctness standard and found that there is
22
no language in Chapter 11 that imposes a territorial limitation on the scope of damages.
Despite finding that the standard of review is correctness (and, therefore, the tribunal's
decision on its jurisdiction receives no deference), the Court was careful to state that reviewing courts are to take a narrow view of what constitutes a question of jurisdiction,
especially in the context of international arbitration.2 3 It cautioned that courts should
rarely intervene in decisions "made by consensual, expert, international arbitration tribunals, including on issues of jurisdiction." 24 When courts do intervene, they should avoid a
review of the merits.

25

The Court's decision is, in some ways, a departure from earlier cases that showed a
degree of deference to arbitral tribunals, even in respect of jurisdictional issues. The
switch to a less deferential correctness standard is, however, unlikely to lead to a rash of
judicial review applications because it is tempered by the Court's recognition that true
jurisdictional questions are rare and that arbitration under Chapter 11 will be subject to
review only in exceptional cases.
II.

Foreign Bribery Case: Niko Resources*

The June 24, 2011, guilty plea of Calgary-based Niko Resources Ltd. (Niko) represents
the most significant development in Canada's efforts to fight foreign bribery since the
1999 implementation of Canada's Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA).
Along with investigations initiated by the RCMP in 2011 against SNC-Lavalin and
Blackfire Exploration, and the continued prosecution of Nazir Karigar for the alleged
bribery of officials in India, the Niko case appears to signal a new era of aggressive enforcement of foreign anti-bribery rules in Canada.
Niko pled guilty to a single charge of bribery under the CFPOA related to the provision
of a $190,984 vehicle to the Energy Minister in Bangladesh and the payment of his travel
costs of $5,000 to attend an Energy Expo in Calgary and for a trip to New York and
Chicago to visit family. The Court accepted the sentencing recommendation (which included a fine and victim surcharge totaling $9,499,000) and the Probation Order under
which Niko will be subject to Court supervision and regular, independent audits to confirm its compliance with the CFPOA.
A number of key points and observations can be gleaned from Niko's plea and
sentencing:
21. Cargill, 107 O.R. 3d, 528 paras. 41-42.
22. Id. para. 74.
23. Id.para. 44.
24. Id. para. 46.
25. Id. para. 47.
* Written by John W. Boscariol, head of the International Trade and Investment Law Group and a
Partner in the Litigation Group of McCarthy Tdtrault LLP. This section is adapted from John W. Boscariol,
A Deeper Dive into Canada'sFirst Significant Foreign Bribery Case: Niko Resources, THE GLOBETROTTER
(Ontario Bar Association International Law Section Newsletter), Dec. 2011, available at http://www.oba.org/
en/pdf/sec.newsint-dec 1I_nik-bos.pdf.
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1. Complexity of the investigation: This extensive multi-country investigation spanned
six years and was complex and costly. The RCMP alone incurred expenses of
$870,000 and had to work with authorities in six countries. In addition to demonstrating Canada's willingness to commit resources to CFPOA enforcement, this also
reflects how costly it is for target companies who must devote significant internal
resources and executive and board time, as well as retain external counsel and other
advisors, to address these intensive investigations.
2. Influence of U.S. FCPA enforcement: Canadian authorities worked so closely with
U.S. officials that the Crown characterized the prosecution as a "joint effort" by
Alberta prosecution and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).26 The Probation
Order, believed to be the first of its kind in Canada, was drafted in consultation with
the U.S. DOJ and was described by the Crown as "a Canadianized version of similar
enforcement actions in the United States," 27 suggesting that Canadian prosecutors,
and possibly courts, will be significantly influenced by U.S. precedent.
3. Sentencing factors before the Court: Although Niko had not come forward to voluntarily disclose these issues prior to the RCMP's initiation of the investigation,
there were several mitigating factors before the Court. These included Niko's guilty
plea, which avoided expending further Crown resources; its cooperation with authorities once it knew it was being investigated; its agreement to take remedial steps
and cooperate on a go-forward basis its lack of a prior record; and that ultimately the
bribes were found not to have any influence or effect. Aggravating factors considered by the Court included Niko's position as a large global company, the seniority
of the bribed government official, the existence of two separate instances of bribery,
and the significant resources expended on the RCMP investigation.
4. Real and substantial connection: Under Canadian common law, the commission of
an offence under the CFPOA requires a "real and substantial" connection to the
territory of Canada. Here, the parties agreed that there was a "real and substantial
link between Canada and the offence." 28 Niko conceded that (i) it funded its subsidiary's acquisition of the vehicle and knew that the subsidiary had delivered it to the
Minister and (ii) it had paid the travel and accommodation expenses of the Minister.
The Court had before it a number of factors connecting Niko's Canadian operations
to the impugned activity.
5. Guidance on anti-bribery compliance measures: Niko's Probation Order contains a
number of continuing obligations including implementation of internal compliance
controls. 29 The internal controls specified in the Order are particularly instructive
when considered as a list of compliance measures expected of Canadian companies,
and include:
(a) internal accounting controls;
(b) a rigorous anti-corruption compliance code;
(c) conducting risk assessment to develop standards and procedures;
(d) reviewing and updating at least annually;
26.
27.
28.
29.

Transcript, at 22, lines 23-24.
Id. at 24, lines 23-24.
Agreed Statement of Fact, paragraph 56.
Transcript, supra note 26, at 39-45.
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(e) assigning responsibility to senior corporate executive(s);
() periodic training and certification of directors, officers, employees, agents and
business partners;
(g) systems for guidance and advice, confidential reporting of possible contraventions, and protection against retaliation;
(h) disciplinary procedures for violations;
(i) due diligence and compliance requirements for agents and business partners;
(j) standard provisions in agents and business partners contracts to prevent violations - representations and warranties, rights to audit books nd records, and
rights to terminate; and
(k) periodic review and testing of compliance systems.
IM. Canadian Competition Law*
In 2011, the Canadian Competition Bureau (the Bureau) continued its aggressive enforcement stance, focusing on mergers, abuse of dominance, and anti-competitive
practices.
A.

MERGERS

The Bureau challenged a completed merger in January 2011 that was below the Competition Act's compulsory notification thresholds, the first contested merger application in
Canada since 2005.30 The transaction involved the acquisition of a landfill site in British
Columbia. 31 Based in part on the buyer's internal documents, the Bureau alleged that the
buyer acquired the landfill to protect its monopoly position and eliminate competition
from a prospective entrant. 32 The Bureau advised the buyer of its concerns prior to closing, but no resolution was reached. In a somewhat unusual step, the Bureau agreed to
permit the transaction to close subject to a written undertaking from the buyer to preserve
and maintain all approvals necessary for the operation of the landfill and pending determination of the Bureau's challenge to the acquisition. 33 Also of note is that the Bureau is
seeking dissolution of the merger and has accordingly named the vendors as parties to the
application as well. 34 The case was ongoing at the time of this writing. The Bureau has
indicated that it intends to more aggressively examine the competitive implications of
3
non-notifiable transactions and is investigating other mergers that fall in this category.
* This section was written by Mark Katz, Partner in the Competition & Foreign Investment Review
practice at Davies Ward Phillips & Vmeberg LLP, and Erika Douglas, Associate in the Competition &
Foreign Investment Review practice at Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP.
30. Competition Act, RSC 1985, c. C-34, pt. IX; Comm'r of Competition v. CCS Corporation et al. (2011)
CT-2011-002 (Can. Comp. Trib.).
31. CCS Corp., CT-2011-002, para. 1.

32. Id. paras. 21-28.
33. Id. para. 16.
34. Id. paras. 5, 13.
35. See Melanie L. Aitken, Comm'r of Competition, Keynote Speech at the Canadian Bar Ass'n 2011 Fall
424
Conference (Oct. 6, 2011), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03
Spring
Conference
Bar
Ass'n
the
Canadian
Speech
at
of
Competition,
Comm'r
L.
Aitken,
.html; Melanie
(May 3, 2011); Melanie L. Aitken, Comm'r of Competition, Speech at the Canadian Bar Ass'n Spring Con8
ference (May 3, 2011), available at http://www.compeitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/033 3.html.
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The Commissioner also brought proceedings in 2011 for orders to prohibit a proposed
joint venture between two major airlines, Air Canada and United Continental.3 6 The
Bureau challenged the transaction under the Competition Act's merger review provisions
even though the joint venture did not involve either airline acquiring an ownership stake
in the other. 37 According to the Bureau, the proposed joint venture constitutes a merger
because it would "comprehensively integrate" the Canada/U.S. operations of Air Canada
and United Continental to an extent that "is indistinguishable in all respects from common ownership."38
In addition to challenging the joint venture, the Bureau is also seeking to unwind certain cooperation agreements that form the underlying basis for the joint venture.39 The
Bureau is relying in this regard on the Competition Act's civil prohibition against agreements between competitors that prevent or lessen competition substantially.40 The Bureau's application marks the first time that this provision has been utilized since it came
into force in March 2010.41
B.

ABUSE OF DOMINANCE

The Bureau has challenged certain rules enacted by Canada's largest real estate board,
the Toronto Real Estate Board (TREB), under the Competition Act's abuse of dominance
provisions. 42 The Bureau alleged that certain TREB rules restrict its members' ability to
offer services over the Internet and constitute an abuse of the dominant position held by
TREB and its members in the supply of residential real estate brokerage services in the
Toronto area. 43 This case echoes the Bureau's application against the Canadian Real Estate Association in 2010. Both applications focused on the ability of real estate associations to exclude or discipline non-compliant existing and prospective members by
foreclosing access to an online real estate listing system. The TREB case was ongoing at
the time of writing.
C. ANI-CoMPET-1IVE PRACTICES
The Bureau's civil proceeding against Visa and MasterCard continued in 2011.44 The
Bureau has alleged that the fees imposed on merchants by these credit card companies
36. Notice of Application, Canada Comm'r of Competition v. Air Canada et al. (2011) CT-2011-004 (Can.
Comp. Trib.), available at http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/CMFiles/CT-2011-004-Notice%20of%20Application-l45_6-27-201 1_7637.pdf.
37. Id. para. 36.
38. Id. paras. 37, 39.

39. Id. paras. 21-31.
40. Id. paras. 54-62.
41. See Aitken, Keynote Speech, supra note 35.
42. Notice of Application, Canada Comm'r of Competition v. The Toronto Real Estate Board (2011), CT2011-003 (Can. Comp. Trib.), available at http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/CMFiles/CT-2011-003-Notice%20of%20
Application-1..45_5-27-2011_7069.pdf.
43. Id. para. 3.
44. Notice of Application, Comm'r of Competition v. Visa Canada Corp. et al. (2010), CT-2010-010 (Can.
Comp. Trib.), available at http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/CMFiles/CT-2010-010_Notice%20of%20Application%20
pursuant% 20to% 20section% 2076% 20ofo 20the% 2OCompetition% 20Act% 20% 20Price% 20Maintenance-I
_38_12-15-2010_7965.pdf.
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45
have the anti-competitive effect of driving up consumer prices. The application was
brought under the civil price maintenance provision, which prohibits parties from "influencing upward" the price at which products are supplied when such conduct has had, is
46
having, or is likely to have an adverse effect on competition.
The Bureau also secured a significant settlement in 2011 in a case involving one of
Canada's largest telecommunications companies.4 7 The company agreed to pay an administrative monetary penalty of CDN 10 million, the maximum permitted under the
48
Competition Act, in relation to alleged misleading advertising practices. This is the first
time that the maximum penalty for misleading advertising has been secured. The Bureau
alleged that the company made false or misleading representations about the prices at
which certain of its services were available. 49 The company had used fine print disclosures, which the Bureau argued contradicted the general impression of its advertised pricing.so Under the consent agreement with the Bureau, the company did not accept the
Bureau allegations, but agreed not to contest the allegations, to pay the penalty, and to
51
modify all non-compliant advertising.

REPORTS/GUIDELINES

D.

In October 2011, the Bureau released newly revised Merger Enforcement Guidelines
(MEGs).52 The MEGs set out the analytical framework used by the Bureau to review
mergers and acquisitions under Canada's Competition Act. 53 The most notable change is
54
the Bureau,'s statement that it need not define relevant markets as part of its analysis.
This follows the example of U.S. antitrust enforcement authorities but is inconsistent with
the (limited) Canadian case law on point.

IV.

WTO Challenges to the Green Energy Act*

In May 2009, the Province of Ontario passed the Green Energy and Economy Act, an
objective of which is to "stimulate the green energy sector in Ontario" by "creating green
45. Id. paras. 1-4.
46. See Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, pt. VIII, art. 76 (Can.).
47. Consent Agreement, Comm'r of Competition v. Bell Canada (2011), CT-2011-005 (Can. Comp.
Trib.), availableat http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/CMFiles/CT-2011-005-Consent%2OAgreement_1_45_6-28-2011_
7559.pdf.
48. Press Release, Canada Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Reaches Agreement with Bell Canada
Requiring Bell to Pay $10 Million for Misleading Advertising (June 28, 2011), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03388.html.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Consent Agreement, supra note 47, paras. 2-3.
52. CANADA CoMPETrrioN BusR.u, MERGER ENFORCEMENT GMDELINES (2011), available at http://
www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/cb-meg-201 l-e.pdf/$FILE/cb-meg-20l l-e.pdf.
53. Id. at 1.
54. Id. para. 3.1.

* Written by Wendy Wagner, Partner at Gowlings and leader of the Firm's Transportation and Logistics
National Practice Group.
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jobs and providing clean renewable power to Ontario."55 A key component is the Feed-in
Tariff (FIT) program, which permits companies to sell electricity from wind, solar, hydro,
biomass, biogas, and landfill gas projects back to the provincial energy grid at guaranteed
rates for the next twenty yearss 6 At issue in World Trade Organization (WTO) proceedings are domestic content requirements for goods and services procured for wind power
projects greater than ten kilowatts and all solar projects, which are imposed within FIT
57
contracts.
In September 2010, Japan requested WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding consultations with Canada, which were joined by the United States and the European Union. 58
Consultations did not resolve the matter, and on July 20, 2011, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel, which was composed on October 6, 2011. 59 In August
2011, the European Union initiated its own WTO complaint against the FIT program,
60
with the United States and Japan joining in consultations.
Both Japan and the European Union allege that the FIT Program breaches the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Articles ml.4 and II.5 (national treatment obligations), Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)61
(referring back to GAYF national treatment obligations), and Articles 1.1, 3.1(b) and 3.2
of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 62 (prohibiting subsidies that
are contingent on the use of domestic content).63 The complainants do not allege breach
of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA),64 which prohibits measures
used to encourage local development such as domestic content requirements ("offsets").
While Canada has extended its commitments under the GPA to certain provincial entities
as a result of the Canada-U.S. "Buy American" agreement, it has not listed the Ontario
Power Authority (OPA) in the GPA Annex 2 commitments for Ontario, with the effect
that procurement of energy by the OPA is not subject to the disciplines of the GPA.65
55. General Information About the Green Energy and Green Economy Act, ONT. POWER AUTH., http://
fit.powerauthority.on.ca/general-infonnation-about-green-energy-and-green-economy-act (last visited Feb.
15, 2012).
56. Id.; FIT Program Pricing, ONT. POWER AtrrH., http://fit.powerauthority.on.ca/fit-program-pricing
(last visited Feb. 15, 2012); Renewable Technologies, ONT. POWER AuT., http://fit.powerauthority.on.ca/re-

newable-technologies (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
57. Feed-In-TariffProgram Overview, ONT. POWER AUTH-., http://fit.powerauthority.on.ca/program-overview (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
58. Summary of Canada-CertainMeasures Affecting the Renewable Energy Sector, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct.
6, 2011), http://www.wto.org/engish/tratop-e/dispu.e/cases-e/ds4l2_e.hin.
59. Id.
60. Summary of Canada-MeasuresRelating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WORLD TRADE ORG., (Jan. 20,
2012) http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases_e/ds426_e.htm.
61. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter
TRIMS Agreement].
62. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter
SCM Agreement].
63. The Complainants also claim a breach of GATT art. XXIII, para. 1, Nullification or Impairment. See
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIII, para. I, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
GATT 1994].
64. Agreement on Government Procurement, April 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 508.
65. Agreement Between The Government of Canada and The Government of The United States of
America on Government Procurement, U.S.-Can., annex 2, Feb. 12, 2010, available at http://www.intema-
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GATT Article 111.4 obligates member countries to ensure that imported products are
afforded treatment no less favorable than that afforded to domestic products, in respect of
66
all laws, regulations, and requirements affecting their internal sale, use, or distribution.
Article 111.5 prohibits the adoption of certain internal quantitative regulations that directly
or indirectly require that products subject to the regulation be supplied from domestic
sources. 67 Canada can be expected to argue that GATT national treatment obligations are
not applicable because the FIT Program falls within GATT Article 111.8, which carves
out, "laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental
agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to com68
mercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial resale."
An issue will be whether energy purchased under the FIT Program is "purchased for
governmental purposes" and "not with a view to commercial resale" (for example, if energy procured under the FIT Program is exported by Ontario). Canada may also claim
the FIT program does not violate national treatment obligations because foreign and domestic companies are subject to the same requirements, and therefore the program is not
"discriminatory."
The TRIMs Agreement provides that no WTO member country shall apply any traderelated investment measures in a manner that is inconsistent with GATT Article III (national treatment). 69 Among the measures identified as inconsistent with GATT Article II
are those which are mandatory or enforceable under law, or compliance with which is
necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require "the purchase or use by an enterprise
of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in terms of
particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of
volume or value of its local production." 70 The FIT Program arguably falls within the
illustrative list in that it conditions the receipt of an advantage (the purchase of energy at
guaranteed rates) upon the purchase or use of products and services from a domestic
source. Again, the issue will be whether the government procurement exemption in
GATT Article M1I.8 applies to exempt the FIT Program from national treatment
obligations.
Japan and the European Union allege that the FIT Program violates the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) because it is a prohibited "subsidy" that is contingent on use of domestic over imported goods. 71 SGM Agreement "battle lines" will be drawn on whether the FIT Program is a "subsidy." Government
procurement programs may be considered a subsidy if the procurement confers a financial
benefit because the price paid by government is artificially high. Apart from the factual
issue of pricing, Canada can be expected to defend this allegation by asserting that the
purchasing body is a private body and is not carrying out a function normally vested in
government, and therefore there is no "benefit conferred."
tional.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/ENG-Canada-USA-Government-Procurement.pdf.
66. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, Nov. 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
67. Id. art. I at para. 5.
68. Id. art. HI at para. 8.
69. TRIMS Agreement, supra note 61.
70. Id. art. II, at para. 1 (in conjunction with para. l(a) of the Illustrative List).
71. SCM Agreement, supra note 62, at arts. 1.1, 3.1(b), 3.2.
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The challenge to the Green Energy Act raises complex legal issues that will be followed
by both private sector market participants and governments around the world. The Ontario FIT program is not unique but was modeled after successful initiatives in several Euro72
pean countries, including Germany, Spain, and Denmark. To the extent that the WTO
proceedings impose disciplines on such programs, the impact will be global.
V.

Canadian Securities Law*

Canadian securities are generally regulated by provinces rather than the federal government.73 Each province has its own securities regulatory authority (commonly referred to
74
as securities commissions), which vary in structure from province to province. Through
recognition and oversight by the securities commissions, a number of stock exchanges and
75
self-regulating organizations facilitate the functions of the securities commissions.
A.

REFERENCE RE PROPOSED CANADIAN SECURITIES

ACT

In Canada, pursuant to section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, the Governor in Council
can refer important questions of law or fact to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC).76
The question presented was whether "the annexed Proposed Canadian Securities Act [is]
77
within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada." To determine whether an
the main thrust of the
identify
must
first
power
"we
act is within Parliament's legislative
proposed legislation having regard to its purpose and effects and then ask whether the
scheme meets the indicia set out in GeneralMotors,"78 establishing the pith and substance
of the act; then the act must comport with the subject matters listed in sections 91 and 92
79
of the Constitution Act 1867.
B.

80

QUEBEC AND ALBERTA

Both the Appellate Courts of Alberta and then Quebec heard and answered in the negative on this question.8 ' The majority found that the pith and substance of the Proposed
Canadian Securities Act (the Act) could not be distinguished from current provincial legis72. Ontario Unveils North America's First Feed-In Tariff ONTr. POWER AUTH., (Mar.12, 2009), http://
fit.powerauthority.on.ca/march- 12-2009-ontario-unveils-north-americas-first-feed-tariff.
* Written by Justin G. Persaud, LL.M. candidate in securities law at Osgoode Hall Law School.
73. DAVID JOHNSTON AND KATHLEEN DOYLE ROCKWELL, CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION 13 (4th

ed. 2006).
74. Id. at 14-15.

75. Id. at 15.
76. Supierne Court Act, R.S.C 1985, c. S-26, § 53 (1985), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/
stat/rsc-1985-c-s-26Aatest/rsc-1985-c-s-26.htl (references by Governor in Council).
77. Archived-Fact Sheet on Reference to the Supreme Court of Canadaon the Proposed CanadianSecurities Act,
DEP'T OF FIN.CAN. (May 5, 2010), http://www.fin.gc.ca/nlO/data/10-051-3-eng.asp#cont.
78. Reference Re: Securities Act, SCC 66, para. 92 (2011).
79. Reference Re: Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457, para. 19 (Can.).
80. See Reference Re: Power of Parliament to Regulate Securities, 2011 QCCA 591 (Can.), available at http://
2
www.canlii.org/en/qc/qcca/doc/ 011/2011 qcca591/201 1qcca59l .html; Reference Re Securities Act, 2011 ABCA
77 (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ab/abca/doc/2011/201labca77/201 labca77.html.
81. Reference Re: Power of Parliamentto Regulate Securities, 2011 QCCA 591, para. 226; Reference Re Securities
Act, 2011 ABCA 77, paras. 47-49.
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lation.82 The majority then turned to determine whether the Act fell under the federal
"trade and commerce" head of power.8 3 The SCC set out five indicators to determine
84
whether a law was validly enacted under the trade and commerce head of power:
(1) The impugned legislation must be part of a regulatory scheme, (2) the scheme
must be monitored by the continuing oversight of a regulatory agency, (3) the legislation must be concerned with trade as a whole rather than with a particular industry,
(4) the legislation should be of a nature that provinces jointly or severally would be
constitutionally incapable of enacting, and (5) The failure to include one or more
provinces or localities in a legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful operation of the scheme in other parts of the country.
Both Courts found that the Act failed the last three indicators. 85

C.

SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

86

In a unanimous decision, released on December 22, 2011, the SCC held that "[t]he
Securities Act as presently drafted is not valid under the general branch of the federal
power to regulate trade and commerce under s. 91(2) of the ConstitutionAct, 1867'. 87 The
Court found that the main thrust of the Act is to regulate all aspects of securities trading in
Canada.8 8 The SCC found that the pith and substance of the Act is in addressing the local
concerns of protecting investors and ensuring the fairness of the markets through regulation of the participants.8 9 The Act would have the effect of duplicating and displacing
current provincial and territorial securities regimes. 90
Next, looking to the GeneralMotors indicia, the SCC found that the Act does not fall
within the general trade and commerce power. The SCC primarily addressed the latter
three indicia. 9 1 For the third indicia, the SCC concluded that the Act overreaches the
92
scope of the trade and commerce power by descending into industry-specific regulation.
93
For the fourth indicia, the SCC answered this question, in part, in the negative.
While
the provinces are unable to address systemic risk at a national level, due to the Act's intru82. Reference Re: Power ofParliament to Regulate Securities, 2011 QCCA 591, para. 119; Reference Re Securities
Act, 2011 ABCA 77, paras. 23-24.
83. Reference Re: Power ofParliament to Regulate Securities, 2011 QCCA 591, para. 184; Reference Re Securities
Act, 2011 ABCA 77, para. 33.
84. See Gen. Motors of Canada, Ltd. v. City Nat'l Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, 23-24 (Can.), available at
http://scc.lexurm.org/en/1989/1989scrl-641/1989scrl-641.html; Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc. [2005] 3
S.C.R. 302, 16 (Can.) availableat http://scc.lexum.org/en/2005/2005scc65/2005scc65.htnl, which do not establish a formal test for interpreting the Constitution Act, 1867, but ask the Court to assess the legislation

against the five indicators.
85. Reference Re: Power ofParliamentto Regulate Securities, 2011 QCCA 591, para. 182; Reference Re Securities
Act, 2011 ABCA 77, para. 40.
86. Reference Re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66 (2011).
87. Id. para. 134.
88. Id. para. 106.
89. Id. para. 128.
90. Id. para. 106.
91. Id. para. 110.
92. Id. para. 117.
93. Id. para. 121.
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sion into local contracts and provincial regulation, this intrusion cannot be sufficiently
justified.94 For the fifth indicia, due to the "opt-in" nature and the day-to-day regulation
of securities that the Act concerns itself with, the Act would not perish if a particular
province declined to participate. 95
The SCC looked at whether the Act "addresses a matter of genuine national importance
and scope going to trade as a whole in a way that is distinct and different from provincial
97
concerns." 96 Against the backdrop of these indicia, the SCC held in the negative.
While provisions in the Act, intra vires, address federal concerns (systemic risk), the dayto-day thrust of the Act is concerned with regulating contracts and property matters
within provinces. Going forward, the SCC clearly announced that this issue may be best
resolved through coordinated and collaborative efforts. 9s

D.

PROPOSED ACQUISTON OF

TM.X

GROUP BY MAPLE GROUP AcQuismION

CORPORA-ION

In the summer of 2011, the TMX Group faced a take-over bid by the London Stock
Exchange. 99 The failure of that takeover bid precipitated a new coalition of thirteen of
the most significant Canadian capital market users to form the Maple Acquisition Corporation (Maple).'00 The TMX Board of Directors approved the $3.8 billion takeover. 101
Maple is seeking approval from Canadian regulators to pursue its two-step transaction to
acquire 100% of the outstanding shares of TMX Group Inc. 10 2 Furthermore, Maple is
vying for the acquisition of Alpha Trading Systems Limited Partnership, Alpha Trading
Systems Inc., The Canadian Depository for Securities Limited, and CDS Clearing Depository Services Inc.103 The goal is to create a centrally integrated clearing group that
can provide all market participants efficient and new capabilities. 10 4 This acquisition bid
raises several novel issues for Canadian regulators. This market shift is one of centralization that proposes to centralize the Canadian stock exchanges.
Canada's securities climate is being questioned in regulation and market orientation. In
both instances, the push is towards a concentration of power approach. As of the date of
submission the Canadian regulators have yet to make a decision but their decision is eagerly anticipated.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. paras. 120-21.
Id. para. 123.
Id. para. 124.
Id. para. 125.

98. Id. paras. 130-33.
99. Letter from Luc Bertrand, Maple Group Acquisition Corp., to Susan Greenglass, Dir. of Mkt. Regulation (Oct. 3, 2011), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Marketplaces/xxr-maple_20111007_pro-aquisition.pdf.
100. Id.
101. OSC Seeks Input on Maple bidfor TMX Group, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Oct. 7, 2011, available at http://
www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/osc-seeks-input-on-maple-bid-for-trnx-group/article2194512/
102. Letter from Luc Bertrand to Susan Greenglass, supranote 99.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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New Immigration Guidelines for Specialized Knowledge Workers*

Multinational employers who wish to transfer certain employees for assignments in Canada can usually take advantage of the provisions related to Intra-Company Transferees.
The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)O5 regulations provide special transfer rules for senior managers, executives, and "specialized knowledge workers" who are
being transferred between branches, divisions, or subsidiaries, of companies under common control. The Intra-Company Transferee category was created to permit international companies to temporarily transfer qualified employees to Canada to improve
management effectiveness, expand Canadian exports, and enhance the competitiveness of
Canadian entities in overseas markets.
"Specialized knowledge" is generally defined as a very high level of knowledge of a
company's product or service, or, an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's processes and procedures. Individuals who possess specialized knowledge
have often been instrumental in developing a specific product, software, or process or may
have intimate knowledge of the company's international operations.
In response to concerns about inconsistency in the decision-making process at ports of
entry and visa posts abroad, Citizenship and Immigration Canada published Operation
Bulletin 316 in July 2011 to summarize the criteria to assess specialized knowledge applicants. 0 6 Immigration officers must assess various factors including: (a) education; (b)
special knowledge different from that generally found in a particular industry (and which
is valuable to the employer's competitiveness in the marketplace); (c) the number of years
of experience that a person possesses in a specialized field; (d) the salary to be paid (because a higher salary may indicate whether the employee possesses specialized knowledge);
(e) relevant training; and (f) supporting documentation (including the resume, reference
letters, academic transcripts, and other documents to support the claim). Immigration
officers have been instructed to determine whether the occupation level in the parent
company is similar to that in the position sought by the specialized knowledge worker in
Canada. Salaries must be realistic in terms of Canadian wage levels for the occupation
concerned. Non-cash allowances or per diems (such as hotel and transportation paid by
the employer) are not to be included in the calculation of the overall salary and are not
acceptable for the purposes of claiming that a worker possesses specialized knowledge.
Further, officers are directed to compare salaries against the Human Resources and Skills
Development Canada guide, which contains the average salaries for a specified geographical location.

This section was authored by Sergio R. Karas, Karas & Associates, Toronto.
105. Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 § 205 (Can.) available at http://
www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/regu/sor- 2 002-227/latest/sor-2002-227.html.
106. OperationalBulletin 316-Assessing Intra-Conmpany Transferees Under SpecializedKnowledge, CrrIZENSHIP &
2
mIGRArTON CAN.,July 4,2011, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/butletins/ 01 I/oh316.asp.
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VII. Kyoto Protocol
On December 7, 2011, the Government of Canada announced through its Environment Minister, the Honorable Peter Kent, that Canada would not take on a second com07
mitment under the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.1

107. Peter Kent, Canada's National Statement at COPI7 ENVIRONMENT CAN., Dec. 7, 2011, available at
http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=FFE36B6D-1 &news=B4D2 1F4D-4845-4544-B2BO-F09D56B 1
EC60. See also Canada to Witbdraw from Kyoto Protocol, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011), available at http:/
www.bbc.co.uk/news/wo rld-us-canada- 16151310.
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